Explainer · Privacy
Compromised third-party script: Law 25 and PIPEDA duties
When a vendor's script steals your customers' data in their browser, the incident is still yours. What Québec's Law 25 and PIPEDA require, step by step.
By Sentrix · Published 2026-11-17
On 16 November 2026, according to Report URI, malicious code was served through Optimizely to visitors of 178 organisations. Depending on conditions, it could read cards typed into forms, cookies reachable by JavaScript and screenshots. The full story is in our analysis of the Optimizely incident. Here, one question only: when a vendor's script steals information in your customers' browsers, what does the law require of you in Québec and in Canada?
The incident is yours
The temptation is to send responsibility back to the vendor: the code came from its server, the flaw was on its side. Neither Law 25 nor PIPEDA accepts that.
In Québec. The Commission d'accès à l'information states that a confidentiality incident can occur at a third party holding personal information on the business's behalf, and that the business remains responsible. An incident includes any access to personal information not authorised by law, as well as its communication, use or loss.
Federally. Principle 4.1.3 of PIPEDA's Schedule 1 makes an organisation responsible for information it transfers to a third party and requires it to use contractual or other means to provide a comparable level of protection.
A third-party script running in your pages acts on your behalf, with your customers, on the information they give you. If it diverts that information, the incident is yours.
What Law 25 requires
The Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, as amended by Law 25, requires 4 actions.
- Reduce the risk. The business must take reasonable measures to reduce the risk of injury and to prevent new incidents of the same nature. Here: remove the script or project, block the attacker's domains, rotate exposed secrets.
- Assess the risk of serious injury. The Commission cites 3 factors: the sensitivity of the information, the anticipated consequences of its use and the likelihood it will be used for injurious purposes. A full payment card with its security code weighs heavily on all 3.
- Notify if there is a risk of serious injury. The business promptly notifies the Commission and the people concerned, in the manner set by the Act and its regulation.
- Record every incident. The register covers each incident, even with no risk of serious injury, and is kept for at least 5 years. The Commission can ask for a copy.
What PIPEDA requires
PIPEDA applies, among other cases, to private-sector organisations in provinces without substantially similar legislation, to federal works and undertakings, and to personal information crossing provincial or national borders in the course of commercial activity. Whether it applies depends on the circumstances.
- Report to the Commissioner any breach of security safeguards that creates a real risk of significant harm, under section 10.1. The factors include the sensitivity of the information and the probability it has been, is being or will be misused.
- Notify the individuals concerned and, where relevant, organisations that can reduce the harm, such as card issuers.
- Record every breach, even without a real risk of significant harm, and keep that record for 24 months.
Our article on reporting a PIPEDA breach details what the report contains.
The difficulty specific to third-party scripts
These laws assume you can assess what was affected. With a compromised script, that is the hard part.
Who received what? The payload was rebuilt 26 times on 16 November, and card skimming only existed from 13:43 UTC, according to Report URI. To know who received which version, you need to know which version your pages served, and when.
What was read? Report URI writes that it cannot see how many cards, cookies or screenshots were stolen. Neither can you, unless you kept your Content Security Policy violation reports, the logs of your sensitive pages and timestamped copies of the script.
Do not conclude too fast. "No evidence of a compromise of our systems" answers a different question. The code ran in customers' browsers, not on your servers. No evidence on the servers does not rule out a breach in the browser. Conversely, being on a list of affected sites does not prove information was stolen. The assessment has to decide with facts, either way.
Our view at Sentrix
- Treat a vendor notice as the start of an incident. Open the register entry the same day, with what is known, then complete it. Law 25 requires it for every incident.
- Plan the evidence before the incident. Retained CSP reports, logs of login and payment pages, an archive of third-party scripts. Without them, the risk assessment is done blind.
- Write the contract the law asks for, then go further. Law 25 requires a written contract setting out the measures that protect information entrusted to a service provider. We recommend adding prompt incident notice and access to change logs, which the law does not expressly require. Our questions are in the article on what to ask a script vendor.
- Establish what was accessed. The risk-of-harm assessment rests on that fact. The forensic investigation in our incident response service is there to determine it. Regulatory notification is not included in that service.
- Rehearse the scenario. A compromised script vendor makes an excellent tabletop exercise: who decides to pull the script, who assesses the risk, who notifies the Commission?
The next step
If you used Optimizely Web on 16 November, open an entry in your incident register today, even a provisional one, and note what you know about your projects, your pages and your controls. You can close it with facts. To run this assessment with us, contact us or see our pages on Law 25 and PIPEDA.
Sources
- Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec, Incidents de confidentialité et mesures de sécurité (entreprises)
- LégisQuébec, Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (CQLR, c. P-39.1)
- Justice Canada, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, sections 10.1 to 10.3
- Justice Canada, Breach of Security Safeguards Regulations (SOR/2018-64)
- Justice Canada, PIPEDA, Schedule 1, principle 4.1.3
- Report URI, World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely (16 November 2026, updated 17 November 2026)
Frequently asked questions
- The code came from the vendor. Is it still our incident?
- Yes. Québec's Commission d'accès à l'information points out that an incident can occur at a third party holding personal information on the business's behalf, and that the business remains responsible. PIPEDA says the same in principle 4.1.3: an organisation is responsible for information it transfers to a third party and must use contractual or other means to provide a comparable level of protection.
- Must we report without proof of exfiltration?
- You must assess first. Law 25 requires every confidentiality incident to be recorded in the register, even with no risk of serious injury, and the Commission and the people concerned to be notified when that risk exists. PIPEDA requires a report to the Commissioner when there is a real risk of significant harm, and a record of every breach. No proof of exfiltration is not proof of none.
- How long must the register be kept?
- In Québec, at least 5 years, according to the Commission d'accès à l'information, which can ask for a copy. Federally, the Breach of Security Safeguards Regulations require keeping a record of every breach for 24 months after the day the organisation determines the breach occurred.
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